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Abstract
When a confession is retracted, issues of coercion and voluntariness are important and often 
contested matters in criminal courts.  Counsel may wish to call an expert witness to testify about the 
coercive pressures of certain interrogation tactics, personal traits that increase suspect vulnerability, and
the possibility of false confession.  Such testimony must meet certain criteria (e.g., Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow, 1993; R v. Mohan, 1994), and is often ruled inadmissible on the grounds that it does not inform 
the jury beyond their common knowledge (Cutler, Findley, & Loney, 2014; Kassin et al., 2018).  To 
investigate common understanding of coercion in interrogation, I examined jury-eligible laypersons' (n 
= 50) perceptions of the coerciveness of items representing minimization techniques, maximization 
techniques, prohibited tactics, and suspect risk factors.  Their ratings were compared with those of two 
groups of content experts: social scientists specializing in interrogation and confession (n = 50) and 
criminal justice officials experienced in conducting interrogations or evaluating confession evidence (n 
= 20).  The two groups of content experts showed a high level of agreement, though laypeople gave 
significantly lower ratings to the coercive potential of all sets of items representing interrogation 
techniques.  Given the disparities between laypersons' and experts' perceptions of coercion in 
interrogation, and the connection between coercion and false confession (Drizin & Leo, 2004; Kassin 
et al., 2010; Leo & Ofshe, 1998), the results suggest the need for expert guidance to inform jurors 
about coercive factors which may render a confession unsafe and unreliable.
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Perceptions of coercion: A comparison of perspectives
Suspect interviews and interrogations are invaluable information-gathering tools, and among an 
investigator's primary resources.  Statements made under police questioning have helped solved 
countless crimes, led to the recovery of missing persons, and prevented the commission of future 
crimes (Leo, 2008).  Not only is a confession a relatively straight forward piece of evidence to acquire, 
it is also a particularly inculpatory one; the outcome of an interrogation is regularly the deciding factor 
determining whether a case is prosecuted, and the case's ultimate disposition (Kassin & Neumann, 
1997; Leo & Ofshe, 1998).  Police interrogation, however, does not always effectively get at the 
ground truth of a criminal incident, in part due to its coercive potential.  Coercive strategies in 
interrogation are considered to be those which limit the suspect's perceived viable options (Leo & Liu, 
2009), and then apply pressure as to overcome a suspect's free will and move them towards a given 
course of action (i.e. confession) (Inbau et al. 2004).
In approximately 21-28% of wrongful convictions, where the accused was ultimately 
exonerated by DNA evidence, a false admission and confession were contributing factors (Innocence 
Project, 2018; Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, 2000).  Confession evidence holds considerable weight with
jurors because, while most recognize that false confessions exist (Chojnacki, Cicchini, & White, 2008; 
Henkel, Coffman, & Dailey, 2008; Leo & Liu, 2009), the prospect seems unlikely to most laypeople 
and contrary to common sense (Kassin, 2017; Leo, 2001).  Even if a suspect retracts his or her 
statements and opts to proceed to trial, the evidentiary weight of an admission and confession is often 
enough to convince the courts of the suspects' guilt (Kassin, 2012 ; Leo, 2008), in some circumstances 
trumping exculpatory DNA evidence (Appleby & Kassin, 2016).  
A suspect in police custody and under investigation is not completely without rights or unaided 
by safeguards against miscarriages of justice.  There are certain prohibited tactics that have been ruled 
as unlawful by the criminal courts and are explicitly banned by law enforcement training.  For instance,
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it is well established that assaulting the suspect or using any other enhanced interrogation techniques 
(i.e. torture) is an illegitimate method of extracting confessions (Brown v. Mississippi, 1936; King v. 
Warickshall, 1783).  Deprivation (R v. Hoilett, 1999) and explicit promises and threats (R v. Oickle, 
2000) are also considered unlawful in most jurisdictions.  The small number of prohibited tactics, 
however, still allow investigators a relatively large degree of freedom in how they conduct 
interrogations.
Although using physical coercion to force a confession may be mostly a thing of the past in 
North American law enforcement, instances of highly psychologically coercive strategies being 
employed are still common place (Leo, 2008).  This is problematic, as it has long been recognized that 
such coercive tactics carry the risk of false confessions (Munsterberg, 1908).  An innocent suspect who 
is confronted with police certainty in his or her guilt and bombarded with accusations and implications 
of harsh punishment over a long period of time may eventually become pliable to making a confession 
in order to escape the immediate situation or take advantage of some perceived leniency (Innocence 
Project, 2016; Moore & Fitzsimmons, 2011).  Coercive pressures may be exacerbated by isolating a 
suspect before interrogation (Brandon et al., 2010; Cutler, Findley, & Moore, 2014) and become more 
pronounced in interrogations that proceed for hours on end (Blair, 2005; Kassin et al, 2010).  The 
psychological duress experienced in exceptionally coercive interrogations may even be as likely to 
produce false confessions as the use of physical violence (Leo, 2008).  Minors and those with 
intellectual disabilities are particularly vulnerable to the tactics and strategies commonly used  in 
interrogations (Gudjonsson & Henry, 2003; Kassin et al., 2010; Leo & Ofshe, 1998), and are more 
likely to falsely confess (Clare & Gudjonsson, 1995; Redlich & Goodman, 2003; Scott-Hayward, 
2007) and falsely plead guilty even when factually innocent (Redlich & Shteynberg, 2016).  Both 
groups are over represented in wrongful convictions (Cutler, Findley, & Moore, 2014; Garrett, 2008).
After a confession has been secured, other safeguards apply at the adjudication level.  The trier 
PERCEPTIONS OF COERCION 5
of fact, and ultimately the jury trial itself, is meant to be a safeguard against wrongful conviction.  This 
role is most effectively served when the trier of fact understands the relevant circumstances underlying 
the evidence that speak to its reliability.  To inform jurors about factors that increase the risk of false 
confession, legal counsel may retain an expert witness with the intention of calling him or her to testify 
in criminal court and thereby educate the jury.  The expert may intend to educate jurors about the 
effects of coercive interrogation practices (e.g. the presentation of false evidence or implications of 
leniency) or suspect risk factors that increase the likelihood of false confession (e.g. being a minor or 
having an intellectually disability).  This testimony can be highly informative; Blandon-Gitlin, Sperry, 
and Leo, (2011) found that introducing expert testimony relating to confession evidence could 
influence jurors' perceptions of the coerciveness of certain interrogation techniques, the voluntariness 
of a suspect's statements, and the verdict itself.  Jurors also welcome expert testimony on interrogation 
and confession, and report that they would find it useful in weighing confession evidence (Costanzo, 
Shaked-Schroer, & Vinson, 2010).
The admissibility of expert testimony may also be challenged by opposing counsel, and 
disallowed.  Reasons for excluding expert testimony include a lack of scientific basis or scientific 
consensus on the testimony to be proffered, that the witness in question is not a qualified expert, or that
the testimony would not inform the jury of anything that is not already common knowledge (Daubert v.
Merrell Dow, 1993; Frye v. U.S., 1923; R v. Mohan, 1994).  Regarding this last point, determinations of
the average jury-eligible citizen's understanding of evidence are largely subjective and often unguided 
by empirical research on public knowledge.  The ambiguity surrounding what can be assumed to be 
within the ken of jurors has resulted in expert witness admissibility decisions being somewhat 
inconsistent (Chojnacki et al., 2008; Perez, 2012).  Some courts have ruled that it is already well known
that police interrogations have the potential to elicit false confessions and that jurors are capable of 
effectively evaluating confession evidence without expert testimony (e.g., R. v. Bonisteel, 2008; Riley 
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v. State, 2004).  Others have disagreed and allowed expert testimony on interrogation and confession 
into evidence (e.g. US v. Belyea, 2005), and the issue remains in question.  In this research, I 
empirically examine judicial assumptions about lay knowledge concerning coercion in police 
interrogations.
Research on Perceptions of Interrogation, Coercion, and Confessions
To this point there have been a few key studies examining public perceptions of police 
interrogation.  Henkel et al. (2008) surveyed undergraduate students (n =116) and community members
(n = 169) regarding their beliefs about factors that may influence false confessions.  Chojnacki et al. 
(2008) similarly surveyed a sample of jury-eligible community members (n = 502) on their perceptions
of police interrogation and false confessions.  Leo and Liu (2009) and Blandon-Gitlin, Sperry, and Leo 
(2011) attempted to uncover common perceptions relating directly to the coerciveness of interrogation 
tactics, in addition to their potential for eliciting both true and false confessions.  The former used 
university undergraduates as participants (n = 264), the latter surveyed a community sample of jurors 
recruited outside of a California courthouse (n = 126).  Costanzo et al. (2010) recruited a sample of 
jury-eligible community members through a research firm (n = 461) using quotas to ensure that their 
sample would be demographically representative of jury-eligible members of the public.
These studies have examined the topic from slightly different angles and framed their exact 
research questions in different ways.  Some have surveyed participants about their perceptions of the 
prevalence of false confession, the length of interrogations, or vulnerabilities associated with youth or 
intellectual disability.  Many have also studied lay perceptions of various minimization and 
maximization techniques (Kassin & McNall, 1991).  Broadly speaking, the latter convey certainty in 
guilt and threaten harsh punishment, and the former downplay the seriousness of the offence and imply 
leniency.  Experimental research has previously demonstrated that the specific maximization 
techniques of presenting false evidence and bluffing about evidence increase the likelihood of false 
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confession (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Perillo & Kassin, 2010).  Minimization techniques that imply 
leniency are also particularly effective at eliciting both true and false confessions (Horgan et al., 2012;  
Klaver, Lee, & Rose, 2008; Russano et al., 2005).  The use of both sets of techniques has been present 
in cases of false confession arising from criminal investigation (Drizin & Leo, 2004; Leo & Ofshe, 
1998; Scott-Hayward, 2007).
There have been some differences in perceptions of interrogation, coercion, and confessions 
across the samples surveyed.  Some of these differences may be in part due to  location, participant 
education and demographics, and the exact formulation of the survey questions.  A number of 
commonalities can be seen throughout the results as well.  Across all of these studies, it appears that 
most laypeople recognized that false confessions occur, though estimates of prevalence varied.  
Participants in Henkel et al. (2008) and Costanzo et al. (2010) gave relatively high estimates, but those 
in the latter indicated that they would be extremely unlikely to ever falsely confess to a crime.  The vast
majority of participants from these studies also agreed that legally prohibited tactics such as the use of 
physical violence or torture were coercive, likely to produce a false confession, and/or should render a 
statement inadmissible.  While violence and threats have been consistently recognized as coercive or 
unlawful by laypersons, only a slight majority of participants in Henkel et al. (2008) recognized the 
legal ramifications of other prohibited tactics such as denying the suspect food or water, not reading the
suspect their legal rights, and explicitly intimidating the suspect.
The research thus far also suggests that laypeople likely underestimate the strength of the 
connection between maximization techniques, coercion, and false confession.  Participants in Leo and 
Liu (2009) and Blandon-Gitlin et al. (2011) indicated that they saw the presentation of false evidence 
as psychologically coercive, but they did not believe it was likely to elicit a false confession.  
Regarding other strong maximization techniques such as “repeatedly accusing a suspect of committing 
the crime” (Blandon-Gitlin et al., 2011, p. 244), less than half of participants in this study believed such
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techniques to be highly coercive, and only 15% believed that they would likely result in a false 
confession.  Those surveyed by Leo and Liu (2009) and Blandon-Gitlin et al. (2011) did not believe 
that psychological coercion was likely to elicit a false confession in general.  Only 26% of participants 
in Henkel et al. (2008) believed that a high amount of stress and psychological coercion were leading 
causes of false confessions.  These opinions regarding the lack of connection between psychological 
coercion and false confessions are contradicted by experimental evidence (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; 
Russano et al., 2005), and examinations of false confessions from actual cases (Drizin & Leo, 2004; 
Kassin et al., 2009; Leo & Ofshe, 1998).  On the other hand, 94% of the relatively well-educated 
participant sample surveyed by Chojnacki et al. (2008) recognized that psychological coercion could 
potentially elicit a false confession, and only 6% responded that an innocent suspect would never 
confess under such pressures.
In regards to what constitutes coercive psychological pressure, the general public appears to 
take a conservative definition.  Specifically, minimization techniques that downplay seriousness and 
culpability do not seem to be a strong part of the lay concept of coercion.  In the studies where it was 
addressed, minimization tactics were generally not thought of as coercive at all; expressed and implied 
leniency were not rated by participants as coercive or likely to elicit a false confession (Blandon-Gitlin 
et al., 2011; Leo & Liu, 2009).  These perceptions were not out of line with earlier research; Kassin and
Sukel (1997) also found that mock jurors were unlikely to discount confessions obtained through 
minimization techniques such as implications of leniency.  Understanding how some of the more subtle
minimization techniques imply mitigated punishment and appear attractive even to an innocent suspect 
may require an understanding of social and cognitive psychology.  Minimization techniques may not 
appear coercive to the untrained observer; at face value and from a layman's perspective, the 
investigator sympathizing with a suspect and offering face-saving moral excuses may even appear  to 
reduce the coercive pressures of the interrogation.  
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Whether it is within common knowledge that certain suspect traits and characteristics can serve 
as risk factors for false confession is still unclear.  Some participants in Henkel et al. (2008) and 
Chojnacki et al. (2008) appeared to be sensitive to the vulnerabilities associated with mental illness, 
intellectual impairment, and youth status, though there seemed to be a lack of concurrence.  Henkel et 
al. (2008) found that mental illness was rated as a strong influence in falsely confessing to a crime by 
their participants, though only half of the participants from Chojnacki et al. (2008) agreed with this 
proposition.  There was even less agreement that the suspect being a juvenile would significantly 
impact the likelihood of interrogation eliciting a false confession, with most participants from 
Chojnacki et al. (2008) indicating that they were “uncertain.”
Research on Expert Opinion of Interrogation and Confessions
There has only been some limited research surveying criminal justice officials regarding their 
perceptions of interrogation.  Kassin et al. (2007) surveyed investigators regarding the general 
prevalence of false confessions (they estimated that approximately 5% of innocent suspects confessed).
Meyer and Reppucci (2007) surveyed officers about their use of interrogation with juvenile suspects, 
and found that although officers acknowledged that juveniles might be more suggestible, more easily 
intimidated by authority figures, and exercise poorer judgment, they indicated making few adjustments 
when interrogating children and youth.  They also did not believe that children and youth were more 
likely than adults to falsely confess.  Similar results were found in a national survey and follow-up 
study of 1,828 American police officers (Reppucci, Meyer, & Kostelnik, 2010).  Cleary and Warner 
(2016) surveyed 340 law enforcement officers and found that self-reported patterns of tactic use did not
differ depending on whether an adult or youth suspect was being interrogated.  These findings would 
strongly suggest that officers make few to no adjustments when interrogating child and youth suspects 
as compared to interrogating adults, and may be indicative of an insensitivity to suspect risk factors in 
general.
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Only recently have researchers surveyed social scientists for their insights into interrogation 
procedures.  Kassin et al. (2018) surveyed psychologists specializing in interrogation and confession in 
an effort to establish areas where there is a high consensus (and reveal areas where there is 
disagreement) among experts.  There was near uniform agreement that prohibited tactics such as 
making explicit threats or promises and the use of physical torture are liable to elicit false confessions, 
and that the research supporting those propositions is reliable enough to be presented by an expert 
witness in court.  The majority also agreed that there was reliable research supporting the connection 
between the presentation of false evidence and false confession.  There was a similarly high level of 
consensus among psychological experts that minimization techniques that imply leniency hold the 
potential to elicit false confessions, and that there is a sufficiently reliable body of research for this 
information to be presented in a court of law.  More than 90% also agreed that there is sufficient 
evidence that minors and those with intellectual impairments are more vulnerable to false confession.  
There was also a high rate of consensus regarding other suspect risk factors such as being sleep 
deprived and having an overly suggestible and compliant personality.  There was notably less 
agreement on the propositions that it is possible to tell the difference between a true and false 
confession in the absence of other evidence, or that a suspect may voluntarily falsely confess in the 
absence of coercive pressures.
What can be gleaned from the research so far is that laypeople, criminal justice officials, and 
social scientists all recognize that false confessions occur.  Laypeople and social scientists are in 
agreement that third degree tactics and enhanced interrogation techniques are both coercive and likely 
to elicit a false confession.  The forensic psychologists surveyed by Kassin et al. (2018) indicated that 
minimization techniques have been reliably linked to false confession, though this does not appear to 
be common knowledge among laypeople.  Kassin et al. (2018) also found a high level of consensus 
among forensic psychologists that maximization techniques such as intimidation and false evidence 
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ploys are coercive practises that carry a risk of false confession.  Laypeople generally make some 
acknowledgement that these tactics are coercive, though do not necessarily draw the connection 
between them and false confessions.  Regarding suspect traits such youth status or having an 
intellectual disability, the psychological community seems to be in agreement that these are risk factors
for false confession, though the extent to which this is common knowledge among criminal justice 
officials or laypeople is ambiguous, with some evidence suggesting that it is not.  While the 
psychological community appears to be in consensus about coercive factors known to influence false 
confessions, it is still not apparent that these issues are fully within the ken of jury members (or even 
criminal justice officials).  There is not yet enough data to make firm conclusions on many of these 
issues.  A more direct comparison of all three groups would add clarity to where these groups agree, 
and where opinions and understanding diverge.
Current Study
My review of interrogation practise was conducted in furtherance of a larger project, the 
development of a psychometrically based Coercion Assessment Instrument (CAI).  Construction of the 
CAI necessarily began with a thorough review of models of interrogation, and what is known to occur 
in police interrogations from past observational studies.  In an effort to empirically operationalize 
coercion, 192 items addressing various aspects of coercion were been identified and assembled into an 
initial draft of the CAI.  Items were drawn from a number of sources including police training manuals 
(Inbau et al., 2013), observational studies of interrogations (e.g.,  Kelly, Miller, & Redlich, 2016; King 
& Snook, 2009; Leo, 1996), meta-analyses (e.g., Kelly et al., 2013; Russano et al., 2005) and surveys 
of police officers (e.g., Kassin et al., 2007; Meyer & Reppucci, 2007).  These items made up the 
questions of the survey, and data gathered from this study were used to shape and refine the CAI in a 
number of ways.  Coercion ratings from our two groups of content experts were utilized for the 
purposes of item reduction, item combination, the quantification of each item's coercive potential, and 
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grouping items by domain.  These analyses are outside the scope of the current paper.
My objective in this paper was to compare the beliefs of laypeople, criminal justice officials 
(CJO), social science experts (SSE), regarding coercion in interrogation and to ultimately shed light on 
the need for expert testimony to educate jurors in cases of alleged false confession.  Though the 
relatively scant research conducted thus far suggests that laypersons' perceptions strongly conflict with 
those of experts, they have never been directly compared to one another in the same study using the 
same scales.  The CJO experts were senior law enforcement officials, criminal defense lawyers, and 
prosecutors with experience conducting interrogations or evaluating confession evidence.  The SSEs 
were academics and American Psychology-Law Society (AP-LS) members who self-identified as 
experts on the topic.  I obtained coercion ratings from the three groups relating to minimization and 
maximization techniques, prohibited tactics, and suspect risk factors in order to examine and compare 
their perspectives.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1.  Research suggests that social scientists are relatively sensitive to the 
coerciveness of implications of leniency contained within minimization techniques.  Law enforcement 
officers are often trained to use minimization techniques, such as those found in the theme building 
component of the Reid Technique (Inbau et al., 2013), and so long as there is no explicit promise of 
leniency there is no violation of the suspect's legal rights (R v. Oickle, 2000).  From the perspective of 
CJOs, minimizing the seriousness of the crime and offering justification may be professionally 
normalized.  Therefore, my first hypothesis was that the SSEs would rate minimization techniques as 
more coercive than would the criminal justice officials and laypeople.
Hypothesis 2. Previous survey research (i.e. Blandon-Gitlin et al., 2011; Leo & Liu, 2009) 
indicated that laypeople do not perceive minimization techniques to be coercive at all, whereas CJOs 
should at very least be aware of how directly communicating leniency is unlawful (R v. Oickle, 2000), 
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and is prohibited by interrogation training (Buckley, 2017).  Therefore, the second hypothesis was that 
laypeople would give lower coercion ratings to minimization techniques as compared to both groups of
content experts.
Hypothesis 3.  Based on the low estimates of the coerciveness of presenting false evidence and 
its perceived lack of connection to false confessions observed in Henkel et al. (2008), Leo and Liu 
(2009), and Blandon-Gitlin et al. (2011), I hypothesized that laypeople would give lower coercion 
ratings to maximization techniques than both CJOs and SSEs.  Whether this pattern would also be seen 
in perceptions of maximization techniques in general had remained relatively unexplored to this point.
Hypothesis 4.  Due to the prohibited tactics being considered unlawful and/or highly 
discouraged by interrogation training manuals, CJOs were expected to immediately recognize them as 
such and be more sensitive to their coercive properties than the other participant groups.  On that basis, 
the fourth hypothesis was that criminal justice officials would rate prohibited items as more coercive 
than SSEs and laypeople.
Hypothesis 5.  A lack of familiarity with criminal and procedural law on the part of community 
members was clearly demonstrated by Henkel et al. (2008) and Leo and Liu (2009).  For instance, a 
third to half of participants in Henkel et al. (2008) were unaware that actions such as the deprivation of 
necessities or making threats are prohibited and likely to result in statements being ruled as 
inadmissible.  Therefore, the fifth hypothesis was that  laypeople would give lower coercion ratings to 
the prohibited items than the two groups of content experts.
Hypothesis 6.  By the very nature of their training, psychologists should be aware of the 
vulnerabilities associated with risk factors such as mental illness, intellectual disability, and youth 
status.  There also appears to be a high level of consensus on these risk factors among social scientists 
(Kassin et al., 2018), though not among CJOs (Meyer & Reppucci, 2007) or laypeople (Henkel et al., 
2008; Chojnacki et al., 2008).  The sixth hypothesis was that SSEs would rate the suspect risk factors 
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as increasing susceptibility to coercion to a higher degree than the other two groups.
Method
Participants.  For ease of analysis, I had intended to collect even sample sizes of 50 
participants per group.  A total of 161 participants completed the survey: 87 laypeople, 54 SSEs, and 20
CJOs (9 senior law enforcement officers, 7 criminal defense attorneys, and 4 prosecutors) from Canada
and United States (though one of the CJO participants was based in Ireland at the time of the study).  
The proprietors of Qualtrics Survey Software recruited the jury-eligible community sample on our 
behalf.  Each community member was compensated with $3.30, as per Qualtrics norms.  As a 
qualifying condition participants from this sample were jury-eligible and therefore met the criteria of 
being between the ages of 18-65, residing in Canada, and had no convictions for indictable offences.  
Of the 87 participants, 14 were removed due to indicating they were not familiar with the word 
coercion (i.e. they responded “don't know” or “not sure”) or for giving incorrect definitions (e.g., “to 
tell the truth”).  An additional six participants were removed due to suspicions of random responding.   
Because I had intended to compare equal groups of 50 participants, 17 data cases were randomly 
selected for exclusion to arrive at 50.  
SSEs with self-identified research interests or applied experience with interrogation and 
confessions were recruited from the AP-LS using their email list.  Our letter of invitation specifically 
requested those with “experience in police interviewing of suspects and witnesses, coercion, or false 
confessions.”   Fifty four completed the survey, and from this sample four cases were randomly 
selected for exclusion to arrive at my target sample size of 50.  CJO participants were contacted and 
recruited via telephone, email, social media, or through their organization.  The average tenure in the 
criminal justice system among CJOs was 23 years (SD = 10.96).  Each criminal justice participant was 
compensated with their choice of $25 CAD or a $20 USD gift card for their assistance.  Recruiting 
CJOs who were both qualified and willing to participate proved more difficult than anticipated, and 
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ultimately I had to settle for a minimum sample size of 20.
The final sample used for this study consisted of 120 participants (50 laypeople, 50 SSEs, and 
20 CJOs).  No CJOs discontinued the survey after beginning.  The drop out rate of SSEs and laypeople 
is unknown, as the data were not available.  The final group of participants were 38.3% male (n = 46) 
and 61.6% female (n = 74), and had an average age of 45.10 (SD = 14.23).  The sample was 77.5% (n =
93) Caucasian, 7.5% (n = 9) East Asian, 5% (n = 6) South Asian, and an additional 10% (n = 12) 
identified as another ethnicity or multiple ethnicities.  Age and ethnicity did not significantly vary 
between groups, though the CJOs were more likely to identify as male than participants of the other 
two groups χ²(2, N = 120) = 20.334, p < .001.
Survey.  The 192 items identified through literature review were assembled into a survey.  The 
items can be broadly divided into investigator behaviours (i.e. interrogation tactics), suspect risk 
factors, environmental factors (e.g. interrogation setting and length), and suspect behaviours.  Within 
investigator behaviours were the items representing minimization techniques, maximization techniques,
and prohibited tactics.  The study was hosted by Qualtrics, and participation took place completely 
online.  The survey began by capturing age, gender, and ethnicity.  CJOs were also asked about their 
positions (i.e. law enforcement, defense, prosecution, or judge), and how many years they had worked 
in the criminal justice system.
Ninety-eight of the items of the CAI fell into the survey category of investigator behaviours, 
and these were the first items presented to participants in randomized order.  The question text above 
these items read: “Given your own personal understanding of coercion in police interviews and 
interrogations, how coercive would you rate the following occurrences:”  Coercive pressures can be 
applied as to increase anxieties and force a course of action, yet the mental health care field also 
suggests they can be reduced by increasing perceptions of autonomy (Norvoll & Hem, 2017).  
Therefore, participants made their ratings for each investigator behaviour and environmental factor on 
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seven-point Likert scales ranging from -3 (coercion reducing) to 3 (coercion increasing), with a 0 point
for neutral and an additional option to mark items as “vague or unclear.”
Sixty-four items of the survey represented suspect behaviours that may be indicative of being 
under coercive duress, and 18 represented environmental factors, though those responses are not 
analyzed in this paper.  Finally, the 13 suspect risk factors were presented as survey items.  The 
question text above these items read: “Given your own personal understanding of coercion in police 
interviews and interrogations, to what degree do the following characteristics increase a suspect's 
susceptibility to coercion:”  Likert scales ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a large extent).  Participants
again had the option of indicating an item is “vague or unclear.”
The survey concluded with two open-ended questions: "Were there any important 
concepts/items we missed relating to coercion in interrogation, or items you believe should be added?" 
and "Were there any other comments or concerns you would like to express?"  Additionally, 
participants were asked “In the context of police interviews and interrogations, how would you 
personally define coercion?”  This question was counter-balanced so that half of the participants 
received it at the beginning of the survey and the other half at the end of the survey.
Procedure
Participants were first emailed a letter of invitation along with a link to the survey.  The survey 
began by obtaining informed consent.  The first questions captured the basic demographic information 
of age, gender, and ethnicity.  CJO participants were asked a few additional questions about their 
position.  The survey then presented all of the items of the CAI in random order within their item group
(investigator behaviour, risk factor, etc.) and asked participants to rate their potential for coercion on 7-
point Likert scales.  Participants were then thanked and given the opportunity to make comments or 
voice any concerns.  CJO participants were also invited to a semi-structured interview following the 
survey to discuss their thoughts on the CAI and assist us in making refinements to the instrument's 
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framework; these interviews are outside the scope of the current paper.
Results
Reliability Analyses and Consensus Among Experts
Items were grouped into subsets representing 9 minimization techniques (Cronbach's α = .837) 
and 19 maximization techniques (α = .913) as defined by Kassin and McNall (1991), 14 items 
reflecting tactics prohibited by case law or law enforcement training (α = .904), and 13 suspect risk 
factors (α = .902).  The scale scores represented the average rating over the set of items within the 
scale.  These items are listed in appendices A1 through A4.
Basic reliability analyses were a prerequisite to averaging the items into a scale, though we 
were also interested in the level of consensus among our two groups of experts.  This was investigated 
using a two-way random intraclass correlation (absolute value) analysis on the ratings from our two 
groups of content experts.  By this measure there was a high consensus among experts regarding the 
prohibited items and suspect risk factors, with intraclass coefficients of .846 and .833, respectively.  
There was a relatively strong amount of agreement regarding minimization (average intraclass 
coefficient = .758) and maximization techniques (average intraclass coefficient = .752).
Hypothesis Tests  
I performed separate one-way ANOVAs with each scale score as the dependent variable and 
profession as the independent variable (CJOs, SSEs, and laypeople).  Results of the hypothesis tests are
summarized in Table 1.  Coercion ratings of minimization techniques significantly differed between the
three groups, F(2,117) = 8.40, p < .001, η² = .13.  The Games-Howell post hoc procedure was used to 
examine mean differences between groups due to unequal sample sizes, and in some cases unequal 
variances.  Hypothesis 1, which predicted that SSEs would find minimization techniques more coercive
than CJOs was not supported.  Post hoc tests revealed that the coercion ratings from SSEs (M = 1.08) 
and CJOs (M = 1.40) did not significantly differ (t = 1.44, p = .313, η² = .03, CI 95% = -.13, .78).  
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Hypothesis 2, which stated that laypersons would give lower coercion ratings to minimization 
techniques than the other two groups was supported.  Layperson's coercion ratings (M = .49) were 
lower than those of both the CJOs (t = -3.45, p = .001, η² = .15, CI = -1.44, -.38) and SSEs (t = 3.034,  
p = .009, η² = .09, CI = -.98, -.20).  Notable among the items representing minimization techniques, 
laypersons considered it much less coercive to understate the seriousness of the offence (M = .68, SD = 
1.57) than did CJOs (M = 2.35, SD = .93, t = -5.48,  p < .001, η² = .34, CI = -2.28, -1.06) or SSEs (M = 
2.16, SD = 1.20, t = -5.29, p < .001, η² = .23, CI = -2.04, -.93).  Another strong difference was found for
the item “the investigator offered legal or pseudo-legal justification(s)/implied non-criminal intent."  
Laypersons'  ratings were near the neutral point (M = .26, SD = 1.64), and significantly differed from 
the ratings offered by CJOs (M = 2.05, SD = .99, t = -5.56, p < .001, η² = .35, CI = -2.44, -1.15) and 
SSEs (M = 1.72, SD = 1.21, t = -5.06, p < .001, η² = .21, CI = -2.03, -.89).
Hypothesis 3, which stated that laypersons would perceive maximization techniques as less 
coercive than the two groups of content experts was supported.  The main effect was significant, 
Welch's F(2, 50.68) = 8.27, p = .001, η² = .14.  Post hoc tests showed that laypersons' coercion ratings 
(M = 1.13) were lower than both the CJOs' (M = 1.78, t = -2.886, p = .005, η² = .11, CI = -1.11, -.20) 
and SSEs' (M = 1.71, t = -3.865, p < .001, η² = .13, CI = -.88 -.28).  As was found in regards to 
minimization techniques, the two groups of content expert did not differ from each other in their 
perceptions of the coerciveness of these items (t = .50, p = .894, η² < .01, CI = -.22, .37).  Among the 
individual items, laypersons gave much lower coercion ratings to the presentation of false evidence (M 
= 1.58, SD = 1.56) than the CJOs (M = 2.42, SD = .77, t = -2.91, η² = .12, p = .012, CI = -1.41, -.28) or 
SSEs (M = 2.62, SD = .92, t = -4.045, η² = .17, p < .001, CI = -1.56, -.53).
Hypothesis 4 stated that CJOs would give higher coercion ratings to prohibited tactics than the 
other two groups, however this hypothesis was only partially supported.  Comparison of coercion 
ratings for prohibited tactics showed significant differences, Welch's F(2, 65.34) = 32.94, p = .001, η² 
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= .27, but these differences were not between the ratings given by SSEs (M = 2.49, SD = .57) and CJOs
(M = 2.63, SD = .39, t = 1.01, p = .471, η² = .02, CI = -.13, .42).  Laypersons' coercion ratings (M = 
1.48, SD = .84), however, were significantly lower than the CJOs'  (t = -7.77, p = .001, η² = .34, CI = 
-1.55, -.76), and the SSEs' (t = -7.016, p = .001, η² = .33, CI = -1.30, -.73), supporting the fifth 
hypothesis.  This was largely due to laypersons estimating direct promises of leniency as much less 
coercive than the content expert groups, as layperson's scores on this item (M = .84, SD = 1.74) in 
particular conflicted with those of CJOs (M = 2.75, SD = .55, t = -6.91, p < .001, η² = .42, CI = -1.11, 
-.20) and SSEs (M = 2.47, SD = .96, t = -5.76, p < .001, η² = .31, CI = -1.07, -.28).
Hypothesis 6 had predicted that SSEs would give higher ratings to the to the suspect risk factors
(as contributing to coercion) than the other two groups.  This hypothesis was partially supported.  There
was a significant main effect, Welch's F(2, 42.21) = 8.01, p = .001, η² = .11.  SSEs' ratings (M = 6.07), 
however, did not significantly differ from CJOs' (M = 5.55, t = 1.97, p = .142, η² = .09, CI = .10, .93).  
Laypersons' ratings (M = 5.39) did differed from those of SSEs (t = -3.80, p = .001, η² = .13, CI = 
-1.03, -.33), but did not significantly differ from those of CJOs (t = .55, η² < .01, p = .843, CI = .43, 
-.76).  Laypersons gave particularly lower ratings to the suspect being a minor (M = 5.22, SD = 1.92) 
than did SSEs (M = 6.69, SD = .55, t = -5.16, p < .001, η² = .32, CI = -2.04, -.90) and also believed that 
a diagnosed intellectual disability was a lesser risk factor (M = 5.80, SD = 1.35) than SSEs (M = 6.84, 
SD = .42, t = -5.159, p < .001, η² = .32, CI = -1.45, -.64)
Discussion
The layperson sample consistently differed from the two groups of experts, perceiving all sets 
of interrogation tactics as being less coercive than the CJOs or SSEs.  I had hypothesized that some 
differences would emerge between the two groups of content experts.  Instead, the CJOs and SSEs 
were in relatively close agreement with one another, while systematically differing from the opinions of
the jury-eligible laypeople.
PERCEPTIONS OF COERCION 20
The findings on lay perceptions of minimization techniques were consistent with the results of 
Leo and Liu (2009) and Blandon-Gitlin et al. (2008); coercion ratings were extremely low.  Results 
were also in line with what would be predicted from Kassin et al.'s (2018) findings that SSEs consider 
minimization to have a reliable connection to false confessions.  The current research confirmed that 
the opinions of the two groups significantly depart from one another, and that laypeople have much 
lower estimates of its coerciveness.  Maximization techniques such as repeatedly accusing the suspect 
of the crime or presenting false evidence were also thought of as less coercive by the layperson sample 
than the content experts.  I had hypothesized this based previous research showing that laypeople 
believe aggressive and confrontational tactics to be the norm for interrogation (Henkel et al., 2008) and
to have little connection to false confession (Blandon-Gitlin et al., 2011; Leo & Liu, 2009).  While in 
some previous studies laypeople had rated most of the prohibited tactics presented to them as coercive, 
our results show that laypeople substantially underestimate the coercive impact of prohibited tactics 
relative to experts on interrogation.  The list of prohibited tactics was meant to serve as a baseline of 
what is currently agreed upon to be coercive interrogation practice, and the fact that laypeople did not 
agree with experts on the coerciveness of these practices highlights the disconnect between common 
knowledge, law enforcement norms, and social scientific knowledge.
The sixth hypotheses was only partially supported.  The CJO participants did not differ from 
SSEs or laypeople in their estimates of how suspect risk factors increase susceptibility to coercion, and 
instead fell in between the two in their ratings.  SSEs, however, did rate traits and characteristics such 
as the suspect being a minor or having an intellectual disability as making the suspect more vulnerable 
to coercion than did laypeople.  The differences in perceptions of suspect risk factors between the 
laypeople and SSEs were consistent with what would be predicted from previous research.  Laypeople 
had been shown to be unclear about how youth status and intellectual disability may affect the 
likelihood of false confession (Chojnacki et al., 2008; Henkel et al., 2008) while the vast majority of 
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SSEs were certain of the impact of these risk factors (Kassin et al., 2018), and I extended this to 
demonstrate that the two groups significantly differ using the same measurement.  The results of Meyer
and Reppucci (2007) and Reppucci et al. (2010) had suggested differences would emerge between 
CJOs and SSEs here, at least regarding suspects under the age of majority.  This did not occur, as CJOs 
differed from neither group.  
Limitations and Future Directions
As was briefly mentioned, I undertook this research in part to advance development of the CAI. 
The CAI will be a legally relevant psychological framework for assessing coercion in police interviews
and interrogations.  As a consequence, the survey specifically focused on the coerciveness of each item,
and not each item's connection to false confession.  Future research may wish to replicate our 
comparisons while framing the issue in terms of the likelihood of these items eliciting a true or false 
confession.  I maintain that the research is still valid to admissibility decisions on two grounds.  First, 
in order for a confession to constitute admissible inculpatory evidence it must be made voluntarily (R v.
Piche, 1971; Smith, Stinson, & Patry, 2012).  By definition a coerced statement is not voluntary, and if 
an admission is allowed into evidence assessing its voluntariness is a matter for the trier of fact.  
Secondly, the link between coercive interrogation practises and false confession is so strong and direct 
that evaluating the amount of psychological coercion behind a statement is one of the main criteria for 
evaluating that statement's reliability and veracity.
Another consequence of the survey being oriented towards the development of the CAI is that it
contained a number of item that I expected to be coercion-reducing.  For that reason, most of the scales 
used in the survey ranged from -3 to +3, with the exception of suspect risk factors.  For the items that 
were considered coercive by the three groups, this limited the range of responding.  Using essentially a 
3-point scale could have been responsible for some of the lack of differences observed between the 
CJO and SSE participants.  Because the scale used to measure suspect risk factors was 1 to 7-point, and
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no differences emerged between CJO and SSE participants on that measure, I do not believe it to be 
highly likely, but it is a possibility none the less.  It is also worth mention that many lay participants 
used the scale to its full range, labelling some of the items making up the scales as “coercion reducing.”
The limited range of responses may have also attenuated the differences between the laypeople and 
content expert groups, masking how pronounced those differences in perceptions of coercion really are.
It has been established here that laypeople have a different understanding of police interrogation than 
CJOs or SSEs, but the strength and extent of the divergence should be further explored while allowing 
participants a much wider range of responding.
The CJO sample was smaller than I had hoped to recruit.  All of the CJOs were highly 
experienced with interrogations and confession evidence, and that they were experts on the subjects is 
without question, though there is some question as to how representative they are of North American 
CJOs.  It is difficult to state with certainty whether the same pattern of differences observed here would
replicate when comparing different samples of CJOs to SSEs and laypeople.  The small sample size 
also precluded comparing the CJOs by profession (i.e. comparing law enforcement, prosecutors, and 
defense attorneys) or by region.  Future research should survey a much broader range and larger group 
of CJOs across North America, and hopefully include criminal judges as well.
I presented the items free of any context.  During my interviews with CJOs several of them 
remarked that this made it somewhat difficult for them to judge each item's coerciveness.  For example,
in regards to the item “the investigator invaded the suspect's personal space” one detective pointed out 
that this could have very different effects depending on the investigator's physical characteristics.  He 
specifically mentioned that a large and dominant young male investigator doing something of this 
nature would likely have a stronger coercive effect than if the investigator were an older female 
detective.  Another senior law enforcement official commented that ethnic and cultural differences 
between the investigator and suspect also have the potential to exacerbate the coercive pressures of 
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certain interrogation tactics, yet our research made no accounting for this or other circumstances of the 
interrogation.  Depending on the type of study, it may be advantageous for future researchers to have 
participants judge coerciveness through crime narratives with sufficient context for their judgments.
Reducing coerciveness and the risk of false confessions is an admirable goal, though less 
coercive interrogations may have the consequence of reducing the number of true confessions secured 
by police, and thereby reducing the effectiveness of law enforcement.  Although possible, a good case 
can still be made for reducing coercion in interrogation.  First, it has been previously demonstrated that 
reducing the use of strong minimization and maximization techniques can reduce the likelihood of 
obtaining a false confession without negatively impacting rates of true confessions (Horgan et al., 
2012).  Second, coercing confessions from criminal suspects - including those who are guilty - by 
violating their voluntary free will is improper from a jurisprudential standpoint and a violation of that 
suspect's civil rights (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982; Miranda v. Arizona, 1966).  To 
force a suspect to confess by subjecting him or her to high levels of physical or psychological duress is 
not a legitimate use of the state's power in a democratic society.
Conclusions
Though abuses of interrogation and false confessions may be rare when considered against the 
backdrops of crimes successfully solved through interrogation, they are sufficiently common as to 
garner attention from innocence advocacy organizations and others interested in criminal justice 
reform.  False confessions detract from the effectiveness of the criminal justice system in a number of 
ways, though the most egregious consequence is the wrongful conviction and imprisonment of the 
innocent.  The flip side of this of course is that the conviction of an innocent person consequently 
results in the guilty party escaping prosecution and remaining at large.  While the ramifications of 
wrongful conviction are felt most strongly by the convicted individual, there are a number of financial 
and bureaucratic costs for the criminal justice system as well.  Such incidents may also result in 
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diminished public trust in the criminal justice system, which is felt by the whole of society.  The need 
for expert testimony to educate the jury on matters outside of their knowledge is becoming more 
established, and the time has likely come to more thoroughly explore how expert testimony on coercion
in interrogation affects jury decision making.  This could be accomplished through mock jury studies, 
or by analyzing and comparing cases where expert testimony was admitted or ruled inadmissible, 
particularly cases of known wrongful conviction should the sample size permit.  Any effort that creates 
better judicial triers of fact and reduces wrongful convictions, whether that relates to expert testimony 
on confession evidence or other areas of forensic science (Findley, 2002; McMurtrie, 2005), is worth 
implementing.
In instances in which a confession is retracted and disputed, those who serve on juries could 
benefit from the information provided by psychological expert witnesses.  The jury-eligible laypeople 
surveyed here significantly underestimated the coerciveness of the interrogation tactics presented, 
many of which have been linked to false confessions, relative to both social scientists specializing in 
interrogation or criminal justice officials experienced with it.  This was particularly true in regards to 
promises or implications of various sorts of leniency.  Laypersons' estimates of the coerciveness of 
minimization techniques were near the neutral point, suggesting that laypeople do not believe these 
sorts of tactics to have any coercive properties.  They also underestimated the coerciveness of 
maximization techniques and prohibited tactics relative to the two groups of experts, and 
underestimated suspect risk factors and environmental factors relative to the SSEs.  In short, without 
expert guidance jury members cannot be expected to expertly evaluate confession evidence, and this is 
especially true when incentives or inducements are made to the suspect in exchange for confessing.
References
Appleby, S. C., & Kassin, S. M. (2016). When self-report trumps science: Effects of confessions, DNA,
and prosecutorial theories on perceptions of guilt. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 22, 
PERCEPTIONS OF COERCION 25
127-180.
Blair, J. (2005). A test of the unusual false confession perspective using cases of proven false 
confessions. Criminal Law Bulletin, 41, 127–144.
Blandon-Gitlin, I., Sperry, K., & Leo, R. (2011). Jurors believe interrogation tactics are not likely to 
elicit false confessions: will expert witness testimony inform them otherwise? Psychology, 
Crime & Law, 17, 239-260.
Brandon, S. E., Bhatt, S., Justice, B. P., & Kleinman, S. M. (2010). Army field manual 2-22.3: 
Interrogation methods. A science-based review. Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence 
College Press.
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
Buckley, J. (2017). There are good interrogations and there are bad interrogations. Chicago, IL: John 
E. Reid and Associates.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 10-12, Part I of the Constitution Act (1982), being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c7, c11.
Chojnacki, D., Cicchini, M., & White, L. (2008).  An empirical basis for the admission of expert
testimony on false confessions. Arizona State Law Journal, 40, 1-45.
Clare, I. C., & Gudjonsson, G. H. (1995). The vulnerability of suspects with intellectual disabilities 
during police interviews: A review and experimental study of decision‐making. Mental 
Handicap Research, 8, 110-128.
Cleary, H., & Warner, T. C. (2016). Police training in interviewing and interrogation methods: A 
comparison of techniques used with adult and juvenile suspects. Law and Human Behavior, 
40, 270-284.
Costanzo, M., Shaked‐Schroer, N., & Vinson, K. (2010). Juror beliefs about police interrogations, false 
confessions, and expert testimony. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 7, 231-247.
PERCEPTIONS OF COERCION 26
Cutler, B., Findley, K. A., & Loney, D. (2014). Expert testimony on interrogation and false confessions.
UMKC Law Review, 82, 3-36.
Cutler, B., Findley, K. A., & Moore, T. E. (2014). Interrogations and false confessions: A 
psychological perspective. Canadian Criminal Law Review, 18, 153-170.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (U.S.S.C., 1993).
Drizin, S., & Leo, R. (2004). The problem of false confessions in a post-DNA world. North Carolina 
Law Review, 82, 891-1007.
Findley, K. A. (2002). Learning from our mistakes: A criminal justice commission to study wrongful 
convictions. Cal. WL Rev., 38, 333-354.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D. C. Cir., 1923).
Garrett, B. L. (2008). Judging innocence. Columbia Law Review, 108, 55-142.
Gudjonsson, G. & Henry, L. (2003). Child and adult witnesses with intellectual disability: The 
importance of suggestibility. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 8(2), 241-252.
Henkel, L., Coffman, K., & Dailey, E. (2008).  A survey of people's attitudes and beliefs about false 
confession.  Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 26, 555-584.
Horgan, A. J., Russano, M. B., Meissner, C. A., & Evans, J. R. (2012). Minimization and maximization
techniques: Assessing the perceived consequences of confessing and confession diagnosticity. 
Psychology, Crime & Law, 18, 65-78.
Inbau, F., Reid, J., Buckley, J., & Jayne, B. (2004). Criminal interrogation and confessions. 4th ed. 
Gaithersburg, MD: Aspen.
Inbau, F., Reid, J., Buckley, J., & Jayne, B. (2013). Criminal interrogation and confessions. 5th ed. 
Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning.
Innocence Project. (2016). False Confessions or Admissions. Retrieved June 26, 2016, from: 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/false-confessions-admissions/ 
PERCEPTIONS OF COERCION 27
Innocence Project. (2018). Featured Cases. Retrieved Feb 6, 2018, from: 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/all-cases/#false-confessions-or-admissions,exonerated-by-
dna
Kassin, S. M. (2012). Why confessions trump innocence. American Psychologist, 67, 431-445.
Kassin, S. M. (2017). False confessions: How can psychology so basic be so counterintuitive? 
American Psychologist, 72, 951-964.
Kassin, S. M., Drizin, S. A., Grisso, T., Gudjonsson, G. H., Leo, R. A., & Redlich, A. D. (2010). Police-
induced confessions: Risk factors and recommendations. Law and Human Behavior, 34, 3 –
38.
Kassin, S. M., & Kiechel, K. L. (1996). The social psychology of false confessions: Compliance, 
internalization, and confabulation. Psychological Science, 7, 125–128.
Kassin, S. M., Leo, R. A., Meissner, C. A., Richman, K. D., Colwell, L. H., Leach, A. M., & La Fon, D.
(2007). Police interviewing and interrogation: A self-report survey of police practices and 
beliefs. Law and Human Behavior, 31, 381–400. 
Kassin, S. M., & McNall, K. (1991). Police interrogations and confessions: Communicating promises 
and threats by pragmatic implication. Law and Human Behavior, 15, 233–251.
Kassin, S. M., & Neumann, K. (1997). On the power of confession evidence: an experimental test of 
the fundamental difference hypothesis. Law and Human Behavior, 21, 469–484.
Kassin, S. M., Redlich, A. D., Alceste, F., & Luke, T. J. (2018). On the general acceptance of 
confessions research: Opinions of the scientific community.  American Psychologist, 73, 63-
80.
Kassin, S. M., & Sukel, H. (1997). Coerced confessions and the jury: An experimental test of the 
"harmless error" rule. Law and Human Behavior, 21, 27–46.
Kelly, C. E., Miller, J. C., & Redlich, A. D. (2016). The dynamic nature of interrogation. Law and 
PERCEPTIONS OF COERCION 28
Human Behavior, 40, 295-305.
Kelly, C. E., Miller, J. C., Redlich, A. D., & Kleinman, S. M. (2013). A taxonomy of interrogation 
methods. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 19, 165–178.
King, L., & Snook, B. (2009). Peering inside a Canadian interrogation room: An examination of the 
Reid Model of interrogation, influence tactics, and coercive strategies. Criminal Justice and 
Behavior, 36, 674–694.
King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (K.B. 1783).
Klaver, J. R., Lee, Z., & Rose, V. G. (2008). Effects of personality, interrogation techniques and 
plausibility in an experimental false confession paradigm. Legal and Criminological 
Psychology, 13, 71-88.
Leo, R. A. (1996). Inside the interrogation room. The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 86, 
266-303.
Leo, R. A. (2001). False confessions: Causes, consequences, and solutions. In S. D. West-ervelt (Ed.), 
Wrongly convicted: Perspectives on failed justice (pp. 36–54). Newark, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press.
Leo, R. A. (2008). Police interrogation and American justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
Leo, R.A. & Liu, B. (2009).  What do potential jurors know about police interrogation techniques and 
false confessions? Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 27, 381–399.
Leo, R. A., & Ofshe, R. J. (1998). The consequences of false confessions: Deprivations of liberty and 
miscarriages of justice in the age of psychological interrogation. The Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology, 88, 429-496.
McMurtrie, J. (2005). The role of the social sciences in preventing wrongful convictions. Am. Crim. 
L. Rev., 42, 1271-1287.
PERCEPTIONS OF COERCION 29
Meyer, J., & Reppucci, N. (2007). Police practices and perceptions regarding juvenile interrogation and
interrogative suggestibility. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 25, 757–780.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. (U.S.S.C., 1966). 
Moore, T. E., & Fitzsimmons, C. L. (2011). Justice imperiled: False confessions and the Reid 
technique. Crim. LQ, 57, 509–542.
Munsterberg, H. (1908). On the Witness Stand. New York, NY: Doubleday.
Perez, D. A. (2012). The (in)admissibility of false confession expert testimony. Touro L. Rev., 26, 
23-74.
Perillo, J. T., & Kassin, S. M. (2010). Inside interrogation: The lie, the bluff, and false confessions. 
Law and Human Behavior, 35, 327-337.
R. v. Bonisteel, BCCA 344, 259 (B.C.A.C., 2008).
R v. Hoilett. 136 C.C.C. (3d) 449 at 458, 26 C.R. (5th) 332 (C.C.C., 1999).
R. v. Mohan, SCR 9(2) (S.C.R, 1994)
R v. Oickle, 2 SCR 3, SCR 38. (S.C.C., 2000).
R v. Piche, SCR 23, (S.C.C., 1971).
Redlich, A. D., & Goodman, G. S. (2003). Taking responsibility for an act not committed: The 
influence of age and suggestibility. Law and Human Behavior, 27, 141–156.
Redlich, A. D., & Shteynberg, R. V. (2016). To plead or not to plead: A comparison of juvenile and 
adult true and false plea decisions. Law and Human Behavior, 40, 661-625.
Reppucci, N. D., Meyer, J., & Kostelnik, J. (2010). Custodial interrogation of juveniles: Results of a 
national survey of police. In G. D. Lassiter & C. A. Meissner (Eds.), Police interrogations and 
false confessions (pp. 67–80). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association
Riley v. State, 604 S.E.2d 488. (2004). Supreme Court of Georgia.
Russano, M. B., Meissner, C. A., Narchet, F. M., & Kassin, S. M. (2005). Investigating true and false 
PERCEPTIONS OF COERCION 30
confessions within a novel experimental paradigm. Psychological Science, 16, 481–486.
Scheck, B., Neufeld, P. J., & Dwyer, J. (2000). Actual innocence. New York, NY: Doubleday Books.
Scott-Hayward, C. S. (2007). Explaining juvenile false confessions: Adolescent development and 
police interrogation. Law & Psychol. Rev., 31, 53-76.
Smith, S., Stinson, V., & Patry, M. (2012). Confession evidence in Canada: Psychological issues and 
legal landscapes. Psychology, Crime & Law, 18, 317–333.
United States v. Belyea, 159 F. App'x 525, 530 (4th Cir. 2005).
PERCEPTIONS OF COERCION 31
PERCEPTIONS OF COERCION 32
Appendix A
Survey Questions Averaged into Scaled Scores
Table A1
Minimization Techniques
1. The investigator offered moral rationalizations (e.g. blamed desperation, blamed uncontrollable 
anger.  Can also take the form of a question: "give me a reasonable explanation why...")
2. The investigator appealed to the suspect's negative feelings towards individuals or organizations (e.g.
accuser/victim, co-accused, etc.)
3. The investigator appealed to the suspect's practical self-interest (e.g. "help yourself out")
4. The investigator negotiated or bargained with the suspect (e.g. put the idea of a deal on the table in 
exchange for information on others)
5. The investigator expressed sympathy or concern for the suspect and their situation
6. The investigator appealed to the suspect's religion or sense of honour
7. The investigator made it seem as if their role was to represent the suspect as innocent or helpful to 
higher authorities (i.e. an advocate for the suspect)
8. The investigator significantly understated the seriousness of the offence/sentencing (e.g. that an 
armed robbery could be construed as a simple theft, that a murder suspect could receive probation)
9. The investigator offered legal or pseudo-legal justification(s)/implied non-criminal intent (e.g. 
"maybe it was an accident or self defence")
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Table A2
Maximization Techniques
1. The investigator directly accused the suspect of committing or being involved in the crime(s)
2. The investigator listed and summarized evidence
3. The suspect was confronted with fabricated or knowingly unsubstantiated evidence of involvement
4. The suspect was told that he/she failed a polygraph
5. The investigator bluffed or baited the suspect about supposed evidence of involvement (including 
implications and hypothetical scenarios, e.g. "what do you think finger print analysis will show?")
6. The investigator told or strongly implied to the suspect that they would be convicted regardless of 
what they said
7. The investigator pointed out the suspect's physical indications of guilt or deception (e.g. body 
language, shifting eyes)
8. The investigator inflated the reliability of incriminating evidence (e.g. that a polygraph is 100% 
accurate, that an eyewitness could not be incorrect)
9. The investigator told the suspect a co-accused was in custody and being interrogated, or had given a 
statement
10. The investigator presented graphic photos or used shocking imagery
11. The investigator was holding/looking through evidence folder (without sharing its contents)
12. The suspect was shown (non-graphic) photos or statements from witnesses or others
13. The investigator used other (non-graphic) visual aids
14. The investigator asked the suspect who they believe committed the crime(s)
15. The investigator capitalized on the suspect's capture shock (where suspect has just been arrested)
16. The investigator overstated the seriousness of the crime (e.g. claiming that a suspect charged with a 
simple assault is liable to be charged with attempted murder)
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17. The investigator described/exaggerated the suspect's future sentencing
18. The investigator accused the suspect of committing a crime(s) other than those currently being 
investigated
19. The investigator accused the suspect of being someone they are not (e.g. a much more serious or 
dangerous criminal, a drug addict)
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Table A3
Prohibited Tactics
1. The investigator threatened financial or professional consequences for non-cooperation
2. The suspect was not properly informed of their rights
3. The suspect was informed of legal rights but not given an opportunity to exercise them
4. The suspect's invocation of legal rights were ignored
5. The suspect was denied access to necessities (e.g. food, water, washroom)
6. The investigator struck or otherwise assaulted the suspect
7. The investigator told the suspect he/she would not leave until they confessed
8. The investigator threatened a third party whom the suspect holds in positive regard (i.e. family, 
friends, spouse, etc)
9. The investigator made a direct promise or strong implication of leniency in exchange for information
(e.g. charges dropped or reduced, sentencing reduced)
10. The investigator made a direct promise or strong implication of immediate release from custody in 
exchange for information
11. The investigator made a direct promise or strong implication of psychiatric treatment or counseling 
in exchange for information
12. The suspect was offered food or beverage in exchange for information
13. The suspect was offered access to a telephone in exchange for information
14. The suspect was offered medication or other necessity in exchange for information
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Table A4
Suspect Characteristics
1. The suspect was a minor
2. The suspect had a diagnosed mental illness
3. The suspect had a diagnosed intellectual disability
4. The suspect generally appeared to have a mental illness
5. The suspect was sleep deprived
6. The suspect generally appeared to have an intellectual disability
7. The suspect generally appeared to have a low intelligence
8. The suspect was injured
9. The suspect was suffering from drug withdrawal
10. The suspect was intoxicated
11. The suspect was not completely fluent in English
12. The suspect had already been interrogated previously regarding the same offence(s)
13. The suspect was in custody (arrested or detained)
